Thursday, May 7, 2009

Conflict, The Queen and Mancur Olson...

I'm not sure if I ever thought I would have the chance to meet and chat with the Queen on the role of youth in conflict, but that's exactly what happened. My path to peace has taken me to quite amazing places all over the globe and more importantly to meet some wonderful people. As Commonwealth Youth Leaders, the Queen hosted us for a special function at Buckingham Palace to celebrate the 60th anniversary of the Commonwealth. Among the attendants were various high commissioners from all over the world, including the representative of the high commissioner from my sweet, sweet Trinidad and Tobago.

I wondered about the role of Her Majesty in alleviating conflict in the world. What say did she have and how had she utilized her influence to prevent conflict? We discussed the great emphasis placed on youth leaders in the Commonwealth as agents for mitigating conflict. Over drinks, she told a few of the other youth leaders and myself that the world was now our responsibility. Would I ever be equipped to face that challenge and would my generation work successfully to create a better world to hand over to our children? This remains my primary concern in life. From my perspective, what is lacking is not the resources to prevent and quell ongoing conflicts, but rather the motivation.

I've been pondering this lack of motivation for a very long time. The class I have most dreaded taking at the LSE, Comparative Politics of Redistribution in Advanced Democracies, taught by JH, is oddly the one that has probably given me the most insight into why conflict still happens. Mancur Olson, a Norwegian- American political economist, famous for his books on The Logic of Collective Action and The Rise and Decline of Nations, has been recognized for his ground breaking theories on the effect of collective bargaining on redistribution within society.

Olson argues that small groups are very effective as they have the incentive to mobilize easily and effectively lobby to change government policies. On the other hand, Olson argues that large groups are ineffective, as members have little incentive to act. If an individual in a large group, such as a trade union, bears the costs to advance a motion, and that motion is passed, he receives only a very minor benefit that far outweighs his costs. Therefore, even though large groups, such as unemployed people might have a collective interest to work together, they do not as they lack the individual incentive to do so.

Olson draws the parallel to politics. His foundational assumption is that individuals act as rational agents. Does an individual have an incentive to even participate in the political process? His answer is a clear no. An individual only has an incentive if he knows that his single vote can make a difference, and the probability of an individual vote changing the outcome of an election is close to zero.

Let us, for the moment, extrapolate his argument to conflict. Does an average individual have an incentive to prevent conflict? Perhaps one currently living in a conflict area does for his own personal security. Yet, what about those who do not come from conflict areas? What stake does the average global citizen have in the Sudanese conflict? As a rational actor, probably very little. He or she more than likely has no investments in Sudan, is not connected to Sudan in anyway, and therefore has no incentive to work to reduce conflict there. My Politics of International Law professor, KA, would argue that individuals may have a moral obligation to stop the conflict in Sudan, but she would also question whether or not a moral obligation can be the foundation of a a legitimate legal argument? Is morality a binding legal argument that can be codified into national law?

How can I challenge this concept of the lack of an individual incentive to prevent conflict and what is wrong with Olson's theory? For one, trade unions across advanced democracies have been effective because they have been able to influence national law. So Olson's theory can be disproved by empirical data. But how does this, if at all, relate to conflict? How can I (or other peacemakers) give the average individual a stake in preventing conflict, that supersedes moral obligation?

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